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THE ISSUE
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The fragile peace
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Kavin Kanagasabai
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Mauled by the tsunami and still recovering from its aftermath, battered by more than two-decades of bloody ethnic violence, and smouldering in a seething conflict between the army and the separatist rebels Sri Lanka has been trapped in a quagmire of political turbulence, ethnic hatred and faces an uncertain future. The conflict dates back to the 1972 constitutional amendment when Ceylon became Sri Lanka, Buddhism its principal religion, and Tamil militant rebels emerged in response to Sinhala nationalism. Nationalism, terrorism and ethnicism have become the defining feature of Sri Lanka, also known as the Pearl of the Orient. That pearl is now disoriented.

When 13 Tamils, including a child and a baby, were shot dead by unknown gunmen on May 13th, any ray of hope for peace on the island was further diminished. The government promptly condemned the killing. The LTTE (The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam), also known as Tigers, a rebel guerrilla group, which has been fighting for the cause of Tamils and for a separate Tamil homeland, nevertheless, held the country's naval force responsible for the ghastly murders. Two days earlier, a member of LTTE attacked one of the naval vessels, carrying more than 700 soldiers, killing at least 17 of them inviting a barrage of retaliatory government air strikes. As if that was not enough, a deadly claymore mine explosion on June 15th destroyed a state-run bus killing 64 civilians, leaving several dozens injured. The blame game immediately ensued - the Sri Lankan government held the LTTE responsible for the killing; the latter accused the government of engineering the attack prior to the arrival of LTTE delegation from Europe with the singular aim of blaming the LTTE. The US condemned it as a terrorist attack; Norway said the latest attack took the violence to a new level; France termed it as a vile attack; India shivered at the possibility of political, economic, diplomatic and strategic ramifications that it may have to face if the fighting deteriorates into a full-scale civil war.

The perpetrator of this dastardly attack remains unknown, but the Sri Lankan government and the US concurred that the vicious attack bore all the hallmarks of the LTTE. The killing marks one of the many ugly episodes of an epic gory violence that has punctuated Sri Lanka's modern history. It has put the peace process in serious jeopardy exacerbating an already volatile political climate.

Founded by its reclusive founder, Velupillai Prabhakaran, LTTE is regarded as the world's most ruthlessly effective rebel army. The LTTE controls sizeable portions of Sri Lanka's northern and eastern territories. It runs its own judiciary, police and even banking services. It has its own army, a navy and created an air wing as well. The LTTE, however, is branded as a terrorist organisation for its tactics and criminal propensity to eliminate any one questioning the legitimacy of its claim as the sole representative of Tamils. Banned by the European Union (EU), proscribed as a terrorist organisation by the US, and outlawed in India, the LTTE is notorious for its employment of child fighters and women suicide bombers with utter disregard for human rights and lives.

The historical animosity between the majority Sinhalese and minority Tamils had cost about 64,000 lives between the advent in of the first war in 1983 and the inking of a ceasefire accord in 2002. The truce is still existent in theory, but for all ethnic intents and parochial purposes, the fighting goes on. The consensus has broken down. The momentum for peace has petered out. No solution seems anywhere in sight. When the tsunami wreaked havoc on the Lankan shores, many saw an opportunity in that adversity to bring the dissenting factions together sinking their differences in that tragedy. But it was not to be. Accusations of bias and favouritism soon surfaced as both camps accused international aid agencies of trying to help one group at the expense of the other. Hawkish Sinhalese objected to allowing the LTTE distribute aid to the people affected in the areas it controlled fearing such an act would legitimise a 'terrorist' outfit. It only swelled the anger and frustration of an already downtrodden community that found itself at the receiving end of power politics between a terrorist group and a callous government.

Even though the Tamil and Sinhala kingdoms had clashed several times in their historic past, the actual discord started during the colonial times in the early nineteenth century when the British brought several Tamil labourers from India to Sri Lanka to work in tea, coffee and coconut plantations. They also favoured the Tamils in the civil service through their classic 'divide and rule' policy. When the island became independent in 1948, it heralded the advent of payback time for the Sinhalese. The 'Sinhala Only Act' of 1956 marked the watershed in Sri Lankan politics. Tamil plantation workers were soon disenfranchised. Sinhala became the official language. Special measures were taken to instil Sinhala nationalism and Buddhism into the psyche of the majority Sinhalese. Sinhala chauvinism, coupled with the discrimination of Tamils in education, farming and land rights, incubated a tinderbox of pent-up hostility.

The hostility still remains volcanic among Tamils and other minority groups as the government remains a mute spectator to their systematic discrimination and marginalisation. This extends to government employment, university education and access to justice. All remain beyond the reach of ethnic Tamils and other minorities. Even if the government manages to weaken the LTTE base, support for the government will always be dubious at large and recourse to violence a possibility, as long as the government fails to bring about constitutional reforms to bring the marginalised lot into mainstream polity and society.

For thousands of years Buddhist Sinhalese and Hindu Tamils co-existed peacefully - worshipping each other's gods, sharing their kings, customs, food and even rejoicing in each other's festivals. What was not even an issue soon became a molehill and finally assumed dangerously mountainous proportions. Since Sinhala chauvinism proved an effective electoral strategy, opportunist politicians have used it to leverage their political opportunity. Today it is a fight between minority rights and majority interests and vice versa. Nationalism sapped the unity leaving behind a section of population alienated and marginalised. Terrorism excised the society of its peace and security. Ethnicism split the nation into the neglected and the pampered. It is an irony that both Hinduism and Buddhism profess non-violence, but their adherents revel in exploitation, war, murder and terror.

The teetering peace process

An element of uncertainty straddles the ceasefire agreement. Despite assistance from the EU, US and Japan, not to mention the chief mediator, Norway to resolve the violent crisis and the efforts of the Sri Lankan army to dissolve the LTTE, the hope for eternal peace remains fragile. During the four year peace process the commitment of the Tigers to permanent peace has always appeared dubious. The dubiety became clear when the LTTE recently issued the 'Oslo Communiqué' referring itself as a "de facto state", justifying its call for a separate Tamil homeland, and accusing the international community for siding with the Sri Lankan government.

When the Norwegian government invited delegates from both the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE to discuss the operational modalities and functional attributes of the ongoing peace process, the LTTE called off the meeting at the last minute declaring that it would not negotiate with a "third level" delegation comprising European Union nationals from Sweden, Denmark and Finland. It was probably a reaction by the LTTE to show its displeasure at the EU for clubbing it with Al-Qaeda as a terrorist organisation. The Tigers went to Oslo with complete knowledge as to who would represent the Sri Lankan government, but its withdrawal from the meeting after all the efforts put in by Norway betrayed its pretence. The LTTE perhaps expected to gain some political mileage out of the withdrawal from the meeting, but it only managed to earn more contempt from the international governments.

As things stand now, more questions than answers and more doubts than certainties cloud the 'peace process' agreement. Even Norway, the indefatigable mediator, which has been trying to douse the scalding ethnic magma that has so inflamed the Sri Lankan society, is starting to despair. After the debacle in Oslo, machinated by the LTTE, Norway has demanded both parties to issue in writing whether they still stood by the 2002 ceasefire pact.

The attrition is frustratingly bedevilling that no country is keen to put itself between the two fighting groups. The EU is already exhibiting a desire to wash its hands of the peace process should it break down. The US, apart from token gesture of calling for peace, is no longer keen on Sri Lankan affairs especially when its hands are already spilling with its foolhardy adventures of 'war on terror'. India, the country to suffer the most should a war break out in the region, has made it clear that it would not repeat the same mistake of military intervention. Its previous military assistance in the isle cost its army about 1,200 soldiers and a Prime Minister.

The Sri Lankan government has reiterated its commitment to the ceasefire. The LTTE is further seen with an eye of suspicion as it appears accountable to no one. No solution will ever be likely until the Tigers change their stripes. If the Tigers believe they can wage a war on the Sri Lankan state and have a separate Tamil country, they should realise it is nothing more than a delusional confidence. The Sri Lankan government, riding on an unprecedented wave of international goodwill, must seriously work on resolving the incongruities in Sinhala polity, and carry on unflinchingly with its avowed commitment to effect constitutional reforms to address genuine grievances of the Tamil community and other minorities.

No rebel group, no terrorist outfit, no separatist movement can hijack a nation if its citizens feel a sense of belonging, a feeling of national unity and a touch of affinity with their leaders. It is something the Sri Lankan government would do well to remember if it wants to win the hearts and minds of its minority population, and ensure permanent peace in the island.


THE ISSUE